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ABSTRACT
Over the past twenty years, macroeconomic performance has improved  in  industrialized and
developing countries alike. In a broad cross-section of countries inflation volatility has fallen
markedly while output variability has either fallen or risen only slightly. This increased stability can
be attributed to either: 1) more efficient policy-making by the monetary authority, 2) a reduction in
the variability of the aggregate supply shocks, or 3) changes in the structure of the economy. In this
paper we develop a method for measuring changes in performance, and allocate the source of
performance changes to these two factors. Our technique involves estimating movements toward an
inflation and output variability efficiency frontier, and shifts in the frontier itself. We study the
change from the 1980s to the 1990s in the macroeconomic performance of 24 countries and find that,





















Over the past twenty years, macroeconomic performance has improved markedly in indus-
trialized and developing countries alike. Both inﬂation and real growth are more stable now
than they were a decade ago. Looking at a sample of 24 countries comparing the 1980s and
the 1990s, we see that 20 experienced lower inﬂation variability, while output volatility was
lower in 15.
There are a number of candidate explanations for this widespread improvement in macro-
economic outcomes. One possibility is that the world has become a more stable place. If
there are no shocks hitting an economy, it will surely be more stable. Alternatively, mon-
etary policymakers may have become more skillful at implementing policies to meet their
stabilization objectives. That is, the monetary policies of the 1990s may have been more
eﬃcient than those of the 1980s.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a method for measuring the contribution of
improved monetary policy to observed changes in macroeconomic performance and then use
it to explain the observed increase in macroeconomic stability in a cross-section of countries.
Our technique involves examining changes in the variability of inﬂation and output over
time. We estimate a simple macroeconomic model of inﬂation and output for each country
and use it to construct an output-inﬂation variability eﬃciency frontier. Speciﬁcally, for
each country we specify the dynamics of inﬂation and output as a function of the interest
rate — our measure of the central bank policy instrument — and some additional exogenous
variables. Using the estimated model, we are able to compute the output-inﬂation eﬃciency
frontier as the solution to a simple optimization problem in which policymakers are assumed
to minimize a loss function that is a weighted average of the squared deviations of inﬂation
and output from their target levels.
We estimate this frontier for two sample periods, the 1980s and the 1990s. Next, we
compute the change in macroeconomic performance for each country using a weighted sum
1of inﬂation and output volatility, and examine how much of that change can be accounted for
by a movement in the variability frontier, and how much is a movement toward the frontier
itself. Shifts in the variability frontier are attributed to changes in the volatility of supply
shocks and the structure of the economy, while movements toward the frontier measure
improvements in policy eﬃciency. Thus, our calculations allow us to parse improvements
in macroeconomic performance into the portion that can be accounted for by more eﬃcient
policy and the part that can be attributed to lower supply shock variability and changes in
the structure of the economy.
Throughout the paper, we assume that improved macroeconomic policy is better mone-
tary policy, and that the major tool for stabilization policy is the central bank’s adjustment
of the interest rate. In this view, improved eﬃciency reﬂects more skillful central bankers.
Clearly, there are factors beyond the proﬁciency of monetary policymakers per se that will
lead to improved overall economic outcomes. Speciﬁcally, the environment has to be one
in which the policymakers can actually do their jobs. If, as is sometimes the case, central
b a n k e r sh a v el i t t l ec o n t r o lo v e rﬁnancial aﬀairs, then the level of their expertise is irrelevant.
As Cecchetti and Krause (2001) discuss, whether or not a central banker can actually stabi-
lize the economy will depend on the ﬁnancial structure in that country. Furthermore, changes
in independence, credibility and transparency of policy can aﬀect the ability of policymakers
to perform eﬀectively.
Finally, there are a myriad of ﬁscal, trade and labor market policies that aﬀect macroeco-
nomic structure and so will have an impact both on the location of the eﬃciency frontier and
on monetary policy eﬀectiveness. For instance, changes in the degree of nominal rigidity or
inﬂation expectations may aﬀect the shape and location of the eﬃciency frontier via changes
in the structure of the economy. Also, improvements in the management of ﬁnal goods in-
ventories may reduce the eﬀects of supply disturbances to the economy (Kahn, McConnell
and Pérez-Quirós, 2002), thus aﬀecting the frontier. Therefore all these factors would show
2up as changes in the variability of aggregate supply shocks in our method, and thus our
deﬁnition of variability of supply shocks necessarily includes some changes in the structure
of the economy not captured by the slope of the eﬃciency frontier. While our technique is
too coarse to distinguish among all of these possible causes of the changes that we document,
we consider it a necessary ﬁrst step.
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. In Section 2, we take a pre-
liminary look at the data on macroeconomic outcomes for the 24 countries in our sample.
Section 3 introduces the proposed method to analyze the changes in macroeconomic per-
formance. Section 4 describes the procedure to obtain the eﬃciency frontier for monetary
policy using a linear structural model that captures the dynamics of each of the economies
in question. Section 5 presents and discusses the main results. Our results suggest that
improved monetary policy has played a stabilizing role in 21 of the 24 countries. Seventeen
countries experienced reduced supply shock variability, but overall this had a modest impact
on performance. Importantly, we ﬁnd that our results are robust to alternative assumptions
regarding the preferences and targets of the monetary authority. Section 6 discusses some
explanations for the cross-country diﬀerences in the changes in macroeconomic performance
and policy eﬃciency, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2E m p i r i c a l F a c t s
We study a sample of 24 countries, ranging from large industrial countries to small developing
ones.1 Selection into our sample resulted primarily from data availability, with the absence
of reliable data on short-term interest rates serving as the main restriction. Our ﬁrst step
is to take a simple look at the data on macroeconomic performance over the past 20 years.
With this in mind, we analyze the behavior of inﬂation and output for two periods, 1983
1The list includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3to 1990 and 1991 to 1998, using quarterly data. We choose 1983 as the starting year as a
result of data availability for the interest rate, while the choice of 1998 as the ﬁnal year of
t h es a m p l ei sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h i si st h el a s ty e a rb e f o r et h eE u r o p e a nM o n e t a r yU n i o n
comes into eﬀect, discontinuing independent interest rate policy in 11 of the countries.
To measure inﬂation and output volatility, our baseline assumption is that policymakers
are interested in achieving an inﬂation target of 2% and in minimizing the variability of
output around its potential level.2 We discuss these assumptions at length in Section 5,
where we consider alternative targets in our empirical analysis.
Figure 1 presents the change in the variability of inﬂation and output for the 24 countries
of interest. We can draw several conclusions from these data. First, in 11 countries, both
output and inﬂation variability fell, implying an unambiguous improvement in performance.
In an additional 9 countries, inﬂation variability fell, while output variability rose. In fact,
for all members of the European Union, except Germany, inﬂation variability fell between
the 1980s and the 1990s. This surely reﬂects the increasing importance placed by central
banks on explicit or implicit inﬂation targeting in the 1990s.3 F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a ts e v e n
out of the nine countries in which output variability rose were in the EU. This is consistent
with the conclusions in Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2001) that the shift to inﬂation targeting
can move countries along an output-inﬂation variability frontier, lowering the latter at the
expense of the former. Importantly, though, none of the countries in our sample experienced
an increase in both inﬂation and output variability.
2For each country, we measure potential output as Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered industrial production.
3See Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger and Sterne (2000) for a discussion of the changes in central bank
targeting procedures.
4Figure 1: Change in inflation and output variability






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-171 -329 -35,698 -7,125 -145
Inflation variability is measured as the squared deviation from a 2% target level (x 10,000)
  
Output variability is measured as the squared deviation from an H-P trend (x 10,000)
We use the information in Figure 1 to construct measures of macroeconomic performance
changes. In the next section, we describe how to obtain these measures and, furthermore,
how to identify the sources of the performance changes.
3 Measuring the Sources of Macroeconomic Perfor-
mance Changes
Our goal is to divide changes in macroeconomic performance into the portion that is due
to changes in the variability of shocks and the part that can be ascribed to changes in
policy eﬃciency. To do this, we rely on the use of the inﬂation-output variability trade-
oﬀ,o re ﬃciency frontier. As we explain, increases or decreases in the variability of supply
shocks shift this frontier, while movements toward or away from the trade-oﬀ arise from
improvements or declines in policy eﬃciency. Since our measures can be derived using a
5simple two-dimensional graph, we begin with an intuitive explanation. Section 4 contains
analytical derivations that are based on a speciﬁc, and empirically tractable, macroeconomic
model.
The concept of an inﬂation-output variability frontier is most easily understood by con-
sidering a simple economy that is aﬀected by two general types of disturbances, both of which
may require policy responses. These are aggregate demand shocks — which move output and
inﬂation in the same direction — and aggregate supply shocks — which move output and
inﬂation in opposite directions. Since monetary policy can move output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
same direction, it can completely oﬀset aggregate demand shocks. By contrast, aggregate
supply shocks will force the monetary authority to face a trade-oﬀ between the variability of
output and that of inﬂation.4


























4For a simple algebraic model and a discussion of the derivation of the output-inﬂation variability frontier
see Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2001).
6This trade-oﬀ allows us to construct an eﬃciency frontier for monetary policy that traces
the points of minimum inﬂation and output variability. This is the curved line in Figure 2,
known in the literature as the Taylor Curve (Taylor, 1979). The location of the eﬃciency
frontier depends on the variability of aggregate supply shocks - the smaller such variability,
the closer the frontier will be to the origin; while the slope of the frontier is determined by
the structure of the economy. If monetary policy is optimal, the economy will be on this
curve. The exact point depends on the policymaker’s preferences for inﬂation and output
stability. When policy is sub-optimal, the economy will not be on this frontier. Instead, the
performance point will be up and to the right, with inﬂation and output variability both in
excess of other feasible points. Movements of the performance point toward the frontier are
an indication of improved policymaking.
Our goal is to measure both movements in the performance point and shifts in the policy
eﬃciency frontier. In order to obtain a summary measure of performance, we assume that the
objective of policymakers is to minimize a weighted sum of inﬂation and output variability.
This is the standard quadratic loss function used in most contemporary analyses of central
bank policy. We can summarize this loss as:5
Loss = λV ar(π)+( 1− λ)Va r(y), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (1)
where π is inﬂation, y is output, and λ is the policymaker’s preference parameter — Cecchetti
and Ehrmann (2001) call this the policymaker’s inﬂation variability aversion. We will assess
an economy’s performance, and changes in macroeconomic outcomes, using measures based
on this loss. We note that we have not included a discount factor in the loss function, since
our measures of performance and policy eﬃciency described below only consider comparing
two periods of interest.
Obviously, computation of the loss requires a value of the preference parameter λ,w h i c h
5We note that, in what follows, Va r(·) stands for variability with respect to a target of the variable in
question, and it is not necessarily equal to variance around the mean.
7can be either estimated within our method or can be chosen based on plausible values
obtained elsewhere.6 Importantly, our results are robust to both approaches and also to a
plausible range of values for λ. We defer discussion of how λ is chosen until Section 5.1. For
the time-being, we will assume that λ is known.
Given the policymaker’s preferences, we can deﬁne the scalar measures of changes in
performance, changes in policy eﬃciency and changes in the variability of supply shocks
that we will use in our empirical analysis. First, macroeconomic performance is simply a
weighted average of the observed variability of output and inﬂation. We call this Pi (i =1 ,2;
periods), and deﬁne it as follows:
Pi = λV ar(πi)+( 1− λ)Va r(yi). (2)
T h ec h a n g ei nm a c r o e c o n o m i cp e r f o r m a n c ei sj u s tt h ec h a n g ei nP from one period to the
next, ∆P = P1 − P2.I f ∆P is positive we interpret this as a performance gain. To allow
for a proper comparison across periods, when computing ∆P we assume λ to be constant.7
The alternative of allowing λ to vary across periods renders P1 and P2 incomparable, for
example, ∆P can indicate a decrease in macroeconomic performance even though both the
variability of output and inﬂation fall.
This change in performance reﬂects both shifts in the variability frontier and toward or
away from the frontier. We identify shifts in the eﬃciency frontier by measuring changes in
the weighted sum of the optimal variabilities of output and inﬂation. Since the eﬃciency
frontier shifts if the variability of supply shocks changes, we refer to this as our measure of
the variability of supply shocks, and it is given by:
Si = λV ar(πi)
∗ +( 1− λ)Va r(yi)
∗ (3)
where Va r(πi)∗ and Va r(yi)∗ are the variabilities of inﬂation and output under optimal
6There is a growing literature trying to estimate the preferences of policymakers. See for instance Cecchetti
and Ehrman (2001), Dennis (2001) and Favero and Rovelli (2003).
7We note, however, that our ﬁndings are robust to computing the measures using estimated preferences
from the ﬁrst or second period. These results are available upon request.
8policy for period i, respectively. ∆S = S2 −S1 is the measure we use to quantify the change
in the variability of supply shocks. We deﬁne ∆S in this fashion, instead of the one we
employ to deﬁne ∆P, so that we can interpret negative values of ∆S as an indicator that
the shocks hitting the economy have been smaller in absolute value, and conversely.





























To determine Va r(πi)∗ and Va r(yi)∗ we use the following procedure. Beginning with
Figure 2, we shift the eﬃciency trade-oﬀ homothetically outward until it passes through the
performance point representing the observed variabilities of inﬂation and output. Figure 3
shows the original and shifted frontiers. We determine the optimal variabilities as the point
on the original frontier associated with this same performance point. In Section 4 we describe
the derivation of the optimal variability point analytically. A geometrical interpretation of
the optimal variability point is the intersection point of the original frontier with a line from
the origin to the performance point.
9We gauge monetary policy eﬃciency by looking at the distance between actual perfor-
mance and performance under optimal policy. Policy ineﬃciency f o re a c hp e r i o di sg i v e n
by:
Ei = λ[Va r(πi) − Va r(πi)
∗]+( 1− λ)[Va r(yi) − Va r(yi)
∗] (4)
The deﬁnitions of Pi and Si imply that Ei can be also obtained as the diﬀerence Pi −Si.
Since Ei will be smaller the closer actual outcomes are to the optimal, our measure of the
change in policy eﬃciency follows immediately as the diﬀerence ∆E = E1−E2.W ei n t e r p r e t
positive values of ∆E as increases in the eﬃciency of monetary policy. When ∆E is negative,
it suggests that policymaking has deteriorated as the economy has moved further away from
the frontier.
Finally, we use the division of the change in performance into its two components to
calculate the proportion that can be accounted for by improved policy. The measure we use





Given that the absolute value of the performance gain is in the denominator, a positive
value of Q implies improved policy eﬃciency, whereas a negative Q implies that policy has
become less eﬃcient. If we observe a macro performance gain at the same time as policy
h a sb e c o m em o r ee ﬃcient and the variability of supply shocks has become smaller, Q will
be between 0 and 1 and can be interpreted as the relative contribution of a more eﬃcient
policy towards the achievement of a macro performance gain.
Implementing the procedure we have just described requires us to follow several steps.
F i r s tw em u s tc o n s t r u c ta n de s t i m a t ead y n a m i cm o d e lo fi n ﬂation and output for each of
countries for the periods we are interested in. Then, using these estimates and an unrestricted
policy rule represented by the interest rate (the policymakers instrument), we can construct
each period’s eﬃciency frontier and performance point. With these in hand and estimating
or choosing plausible values of the preference parameter λ, we are then able to compute ∆P,
10∆E,a n dQ. This is the task of the remainder of the paper.
4 Estimating the Eﬃciency Frontier
The eﬃciency frontier is constructed as follows. Beginning with the quadratic loss function
representing trade-oﬀs among combinations of inﬂation and output variability, we treat policy
a sas o l u t i o nt oa no p t i m a lc o n t r o lp r o b l e mi nw h ich the interest rate path is chosen to place
the economy at the point on the variability frontier that minimizes the loss. Formally, we
compute the policy reaction function that minimizes the loss, subject to the constraint that
is imposed by the structure of the economy. For a given loss function, with a particular
weighting of inﬂation and output variability (λ), we are able to plot a single point on the
eﬃciency frontier. As we change the relative weight assigned to the variability of inﬂation
and output in the loss function, we are able to trace out the entire eﬃciency frontier.
Our econometric procedure has four steps. First, in Section 4.1, we estimate simple
structural models of inﬂation and output for each of the 24 countries in our sample. Next,
in Section 4.2, we undertake a number of diagnostic and speciﬁcation checks to establish
the adequacy of our empirical models. In Section 4.3, we describe the construction of the
eﬃciency frontier from the model estimates. Finally, in Section 4.4, we describe a simulation-
based approach to assess the reliability of the estimated measures.
4.1 Structural Model
P a r s i m o n yi sa ni m p o r t a n tc o n s i d e r a t i o ni nc h o o s i n gas p e c i ﬁcation to approximate the
dynamics of the economies under consideration. As a result, we build models that satisfy a
minimal set of key conditions. First, the model should be general enough so that it can be
estimated, with only minor changes, for all of the 24 countries in the sample. Second, the
model should ﬁt the data reasonably well and yield theoretically plausible estimates to be
used in the construction of the eﬃciency frontier. Finally, the model must be simple enough
11so that we can apply simulation techniques to evaluate the reliability of the quantities of
interest.
With these requirements in mind, we consider linear two-equation systems for each coun-
try based on a dynamic aggregate demand - aggregate supply model. The basic model consists

















α2(l+2)πt−l + α25xt−1 + ε2t (7)
The ﬁrst equation represents an aggregate demand curve. It relates detrended log indus-
trial production, y, to two of its own lags, two lags of the nominal interest rate, i,t w ol a g s
of demeaned inﬂation, π, and one lag of demeaned external price inﬂation, x,t oa c c o u n t
for the inter-relation between the economy of interest and its main trading partner.8 The
second equation is an aggregate supply curve. Here, inﬂation is assumed to be a function of
two of its own lags, representing inﬂation expectations, two lags of detrended log industrial
production and one lag of demeaned external price inﬂation. The error terms ε1 and ε2 are
assumed to be mean zero and constant variance.
This model is a two-lagged vector autoregressive (VAR) model with three endogenous
variables (inﬂation, industrial production and interest rates) and the restriction that interest
rates do not enter into the inﬂation equation.9 This formulation is based on the empirical
observation that monetary policy actions aﬀect industrial production before inﬂation (see, for
instance, the empirical model in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and the theoretical model
of Svensson (1997), among others). We formally test this restriction in the next section and
ﬁnd statistical evidence supporting it.
8External price inﬂation is measured as the sum of the annualized devaluation rate and the inﬂation of
the main trading partner. See Appendix I.
9We estimate below an additional equation for the interest rate that contains lags of all endogenous
variables in order to obtain impulse response functions (IRFs). However, we only need the estimates of the
two-equation model in (6) and (7) to obtain the eﬃciency frontier.
12We estimate equations (6) and (7) for each country separately in each subperiod with
quarterly data, using ordinary least squares (OLS). In some cases we also included dummy
variables to account for currency crises, sharp recessions, or structural changes. A description
of the variables used for each country is included in Appendix I. Appendix II lists all of the
data sources.
4.2 Diagnostic and Speciﬁcation Analysis
In this section we undertake a series of diagnostic and speciﬁcation tests of our two-equation
structural model. We begin by discussing the time-series properties of our data, and then
move on to a comparison of the restricted model to a more general one that encompasses it.
Our ﬁrst test of model adequacy is to establish that the estimated residuals are indepen-
dent. Autocorrelation would be evidence of misspeciﬁcation. Using a Durbin-h test applied
to the residuals of the two-equation model (estimated for both periods and all countries
using OLS) we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at a 10% level
or higher for all of the countries in our sample.10
For the derivation of the eﬃciency frontier and the application of the simulation method
proposed below to asses the reliability of the estimated measures, it is necessary that the
residuals be stationary. This requires either that the demeaned and detrended endogenous
variables be stationary themselves, or that there exists some cointegrating relationship among
them. Since the distinction between these two is immaterial to us, we simply test for the
non-stationarity of the estimated residuals. Using the Phillips-Perron (1988) test we are able
to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 1% signiﬁcance level in all countries
for both periods. This is strong support for the compatibility of our model speciﬁcation with
the integration properties of the data.
Since we are estimating a system of two equations separately, there might exist some
10The only exceptions are the output equation for the ﬁrst period in the case Belgium, for which the
p-value of the Durbin-h test is 0.081, and the inﬂation equation for the ﬁr s tp e r i o di nt h ec a s eo fM e x i c o ,
for which the p-value of the Durbin-h test is 0.096.
13cross correlation between the error terms of the equations that can be exploited to obtain
more eﬃcient estimators with a system estimator such as seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR). To check whether the separate estimation of each equation is eﬃcient relative to
system estimation, we tested the contemporaneous correlation of the error terms of the two-
equation model for each period in each of the countries in our sample. We were not able
to reject the null hypothesis of zero contemporaneous correlation at a 10% level or higher
in both periods for all countries with the exception of two. In these cases, we are not able
to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1% levels.11 This provides justiﬁcation for the
single-equation estimation of the model.
Another interesting exercise is to compare the estimated coeﬃcients across subperiods
using structural stability (Chow) tests. If evidence is found that the estimated coeﬃcients
diﬀer across subperiods for a country, it is an indication that the structure of the economy
has somehow changed and that the eﬃciency frontier that policymakers face is diﬀerent.
Our measures are designed to take this into account when evaluating monetary policy. Nev-
ertheless, even if no structural change in the coeﬃcients is found, our measures are still
meaningful since in this case the frontier has changed little and thus policy will be credited
for the change in macro performance. With this in mind, we ﬁnd evidence (at the 10%
level) of structural change across periods in either equations (6) or (7) for 16 countries, and
a m o n gt h er e m a i n i n g8c o u n t r i e s ,3o ft h e ms h o w evidence of structural change at a 14%
level. There is, therefore, evidence that for most of the countries the frontiers have changed
substantially from the 1980s to the 1990s.
We next test the speciﬁcation of our structural model by testing the restrictions that
it imposes on an unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In an unrestricted VAR,
the right-hand-side variables in both regressions would be identical, with the number of
11Chile in the ﬁrst subperiod has a p-value of 0.016; while Denmark in the second subperiod has a p-value
of 0.044; however, in neither of these cases are the SUR coeﬃcients and standard errors signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the ones obtained through the OLS estimation.
14lags on each regressor, and the regressors themselves, being the same. Relative to a general
unrestricted setup, our model omits the interest rate from the right-hand-side of the supply
equation (7).
We compare our models with the corresponding unrestricted VAR models based on three
diﬀerent criteria. First, we test the restriction using standard (exact) F and (asymptotic)
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics. Next, we provide two more comparisons, one based on
the theoretical plausibility of the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) yielded by each model,
and the other based on model selection criteria such as the Akaike and Bayesian information
criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively). The IRFs show the response function of inﬂation to a
change of 100 basis points in the interest rate. To be able to compare the IRFs yielded by
the two models, we add an identical interest rate equation to each of them, which results in
IRFs that will only diﬀer due to the restrictions imposed in the equation for inﬂation in the
structural model.12
Beginning with the VAR comparison, we ﬁnd that, with the exception of Australia and
Switzerland, the restrictions implied in equation (7) of the structural model are not rejected
by either the F or the LM tests for the ﬁrst period at a signiﬁcance level of 5% or higher.13
Nevertheless, restricting the coeﬃcients on the lagged interest rate to zero for these two
countries actually yields more sensible IRFs of inﬂation. For the second period, 14 countries
fail to reject the restrictions at a 5% level or more, while for the rest the restrictions are
rejected by at least one of the tests.14 With the exception of two countries (Switzerland and
the US), restricting the coeﬃcients on the lagged interest rate to zero in the inﬂation equation
eliminates the so-called price-puzzle (Sims, 1992) in the IRFs, whereas for Switzerland and
the US. the price-puzzle is less pronounced under the structural model.15 We regard this as
12The impulse response functions and the value of the statistics of all diagnostic tests are not presented
here to save space, but they are available upon request from the authors.
13In fact, for 19 countries the p-value of both tests is above 0.10.
14These countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain,
Switzerland and the U.S.
15Ar i s ei ni n ﬂation following an increase in the nominal interest rate is commonly referred to as the price
15evidence that our structural model is correctly speciﬁed relative to a VAR. However, since
some countries still present prize-puzzles under our preferred speciﬁcation, we also provide
below results for a restricted sample that ignores these countries.
Finally, we also evaluate the goodness of ﬁt of our proposed model by using the Akaike
and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC). These two model selection criteria are
functions of the residual sum of squares of the models and diﬀer in the degree to which they
penalize the estimation of extra parameters, with the BIC penalty being higher. Given the
relatively small number of degrees of freedom resulting from the estimation in each period,
we consider the BIC is a better criterion for comparing the two models. When looking
at each country in each of the two periods, the BIC criteria tends to favor our structural
speciﬁcation over an unrestricted VAR. Considering both information criteria together, for
13 countries the structural model is supported over the VAR speciﬁcation.16 Apart for only
4 countries where the VAR is favored, in the remaining 7 the evidence is mixed. In sum,
according to the information criteria the restrictions implied by the structural model do not
seem inadequate.
Overall, we interpret the evidence as supporting the restrictions imposed by the structural
model vis-a-vis the overparametrized VAR model, and therefore supporting the speciﬁcation
of the structural model. In the following section, we use the model in (6) and (7) to construct
the eﬃciency frontier, which will be then used to compute the measures of interest.
We ﬁnish this section by pointing out that when interest lies on a single country, a more
detailed econometric model can be used to estimate the structure of the economy needed
to apply our method. For instance, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2001) perform
a more detailed analysis for Mexico, in which additional variables that help improve the
structural model are considered and structural change tests for unknown break point are
puzzle.
16Among the 13 countries are Korea and Netherlands, for which the restrictions where rejected for the
second period.
16employed to divide the sample, among other things. In this particular case of Mexico, it
turns out that the results in the detailed analysis are very similar to the ones obtained
below.17
4.3 Constructing the Eﬃciency Frontier
With estimates of the structural model in hand, we turn to the construction of the eﬃciency
frontier. As described above, we derive the frontier by minimizing an objective function
subject to the constraints imposed by the dynamic structure of the economy.
To begin, we assume that the central bank chooses an interest rate path to minimize a
weighted average of the squared deviations of inﬂation and output from some target values.









where π∗ and y∗ a r et h ep o l i c y m a k e r ’ st a r g e t sf o ri n ﬂation and output, respectively. This
loss function does not include the interest rate or the exchange rate, since we assume that the
fundamental concern of a central bank is domestic macroeconomic performance as measured
by output and price stability. We note that even though reducing the volatility in the interest
rate is not considered explicitly as an argument in the loss function, the dynamic structure
of the economy may imply that the feedback rule presents interest rate persistence.
Our baseline assumption is that the inﬂation target for all countries is 2%, and that
monetary authorities want to keep industrial production as close as possible to its potential
level, computed by applying the H-P ﬁlter. We explore the robustness of our results to
diﬀerent targets of both inﬂation (using average inﬂation for each period and H-P ﬁltered
inﬂation) and output (using a log-linear trend).
17Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (2001) consider the subperiods 1982:I-1988:IV and 1991:I-1997:IV,
average output growth as output target, and targets for inﬂation of 3.58% and 2.70%, which correspond to
the average inﬂation rate of the US for each period. Using a slightly diﬀerent measure for the contribution
of policy, we estimate it at 93% of the macro performance gain. As we report in section 5.2, our estimate of
this contribution is 94.2%
17For the purposes of exposition, it is useful to rewrite the basic structural model in (6)-(7)
using its state-space representation,
Yt = BYt−1 + cit−1 + DXt−1 + υt (9)
where: Yt =

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The policymaker’s problem is to choose a path for the interest rate, it, in order to minimize
(8), subject to the constraints imposed by (9). The linear-quadratic nature of the problem
ensures that the solution for the control variable, the interest rate, will be linear. We write
this as:
it = ΓYt + Ψ (10)
where Γ is the vector of reaction coeﬃcients of the monetary authority to inﬂation and
output changes and Ψ is a constant term which depends on B, c, D and the target values
for inﬂation and output.18 Equation (10) represents an unrestricted monetary policy rule
(See Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999), in which the degree of interest rate persistence can be
observed since it−1 is a component of Yt.19,20





18See Chow (1975), pp. 158-159.
19As an example of how interest rate persistence arises, consider the case of the US. In the ﬁrst (second)
period, the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate in the estimated interest rate equation is 0.74 (0.80), which
arises from an estimated value of 0.85 (0.89) on the lagged coeﬃcient on output in equation (6), and an
estimated value of 1.16 (1.23) on the lagged coeﬃcient on inﬂation in equation (7).
20The estimated interest rate equations for the 24 countries are available upon request from the authors.
21For a technical exposition of this procedure see Chow (1975), pp. 156-160.
18and
H = Λ +( B + cΓ)
0H(B + cΓ) (12)
where Λ is an 5x5 matrix containing the relative weights given to output and inﬂation
variability on the second and fourth diagonal elements, respectively, and zeros elsewhere.
Following this procedure once for a given value of λ provides us with a single point on
the eﬃcient frontier. By varying λ w ea r ea b l et ot r a c eo u ta ne n t i r ec u r v es i m i l a rt ot h e
o n ei nF i g u r e2 .
Given this estimate of the eﬃciency frontier, as we explained in Section 3, we perform a
homothetic shift of the frontier so that it passes through the data point given by the observed
variabilities of inﬂation and output. This point will imply a certain ratio of the variabilities
of inﬂation and output. We determine the optimal variabilities of inﬂation and output by
the point on the original frontier associated with that same ratio.
We use the estimated eﬃciency frontier to obtain the measures of interest presented in
Section 3.22 These measures (to be reported in Section 5) are simply estimates and not the
true values of the quantities of interest. For this reason, in the next section, we describe the
method we use to evaluate their reliability as estimates of the true measures.
4.4 Assessing the Reliability of the Measures
The main hurdle we face in evaluating the reliability of our measures is that the typical
statistical tools (such as the Delta method) are diﬃcult to apply, given that our estimates
result from a nonlinear dynamic optimization procedure. To overcome this problem we
use simulation methods to construct an empirical distribution for the estimated measures.
Speciﬁcally, we employ the parametric recursive bootstrap (Freedman and Peters, 1984) to
obtain a number of “pseudo” samples for each country. These samples are used to compute
replications of the measures and thus construct their empirical distributions.
22The estimated frontiers for the 24 countries in each subperiod are available from the authors upon
request.
19The recursive bootstrap used here assumes that the estimated model for each country
in equations (6) and (7) is correctly speciﬁed, and that the corresponding error terms are
independent but not identically distributed (inid). These two assumptions are suﬃcient
conditions to apply the parametric recursive bootstrap. In Section 4.2, we provided some
evidence about the validity of our speciﬁcation by comparing it to a more general model (the
unrestricted VAR). In addition, the inid assumption is satisﬁed by the stationarity and lack
of serial correlation in the estimated residuals (see Section 4.1).
We resample with replacement from the matrix consisting of both estimated residuals
from both equations of the structural model. The bootstrap sample of industrial production
and inﬂation is obtained in a recursive fashion assuming the other variables in the model
and the initial values of both industrial production and inﬂation are given (i.e. we use their
original values). Finally, we iterate this process a number of times to obtain replications for
the measures.23
We obtain 1,000 bootstrap samples and estimate the structural model, the eﬃciency
frontier, and the measures of interest. The replications of the measures are used to median-
correct the estimated measures. The median correction is performed to obtain more robust
estimates of the central tendency parameter of the corresponding distributions;24 we note,
however, that the median corrections are small and in no case do they change the sign of
the estimates, which provides additional support for our speciﬁcation.25 The replications are
also used to compute the probability that the estimated measure is of the opposite sign. This
probability represents how likely is that the measure is not estimated in the right direction.
23For a detailed discussion of the procedure see Li and Maddala (1996).
24In general, a median corrected estimator is obtained with the following formula:
ˆ βMC =2 ˆ β − ˆ β
∗
median
where ˆ β is the original estimator and ˆ β
∗
median is the median obtained from the empirical distribution yielded
by the bootstrap.
25T h es i z e so ft h em e d i a nc o r r e c t i o n sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s tf r o mt h ea u t h o r s .
205R e s u l t s
We examine our results in three steps. First we look at performance changes themselves,
and then we report the proportion of the change that can be accounted for by improvements
in policymaking. In the last subsection we provide two robustness checks by restricting our
analysis to those countries that do not show price-puzzles and also by comparing our method
to results available elsewhere for the US using diﬀerent time periods.
5.1 Performance Changes
We estimate models and frontiers for 24 countries over two sample periods, 1983:I-1990:IV
and 1991:I-1998:IV. As noted in Section 2, in order to measure inﬂation and output vari-
ability, our baseline assumption is that policymakers are interested in achieving an inﬂation
target of 2% and in minimizing the variability of output around its potential level, as mea-
sured by a Hodrick-Prescott-ﬁltered trend of industrial production. While the 2% target
level for inﬂation can be viewed as a sensible policy goal during the 1990s, it is less clear
that this was the objective pursued by some countries during the 1980s. Still, we adopt the
measure of inﬂation variability using this target level, since we believe a reduction in both
average inﬂation and its variability, for a given variability of output, should be identiﬁed
with an improved macroeconomic outcome. We note, however, that our results are robust
to using the country’s average inﬂa t i o ni ne a c hp e r i o da n da nH - Pﬁltered series for inﬂation
as targets instead of the 2% target.26,27
Before computing the measures introduced in Section 3, we require a value of the pref-
erence parameter λ. As noted in that section, λ can be either estimated within our method
or chosen based on plausible values of λ obtained elsewhere. Our baseline results are ob-
tained using the latter approach, considering a set of plausible values of λ for each of the
26In a previous version of the paper we also considered a log-linear trend for industrial production as the
target level for output, which yields almost identical results as the ones obtained using the H-P ﬁltered series.
27The estimates of the measures with alternative targets for inﬂation and output are available upon request
from the authors.
21analyzed countries based on the estimates obtained elsewhere by Cecchetti and Ehrmann
(2001) and Krause (2003). This procedure means that we do not have to identify a single
value of this parameter for each individual country. In the following section, we also show
that our results are robust to this choice by considering a range of possible values for λ and
recomputing our measures. Finally, we also computed our measures based on values of λ for
each country estimated within our method. The results of this exercise are largely identical
to those presented here and are available upon request.
With this in mind, Table 1 reports the value chosen for the inﬂation variability aversion
coeﬃcients and the value of the loss function, Pi, for the 24 countries in our sample, as well
a st h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nP between the two periods for each of the countries. We set
λ equal to 0.8 for all countries, with the exception of Israel, Mexico, Chile and Greece, for
which we choose a value of 0.3. These four countries experienced very high levels of inﬂation
during the 1980s, suggesting that inﬂation variability must have had a much lower weight in
the policymaker’s loss function.
Turning to the results, we see in Table 1 that, using our comprehensive measure of
performance, only Austria, Germany and Finland exhibited a slight decline in performance
while 16 countries experienced sizable improvements. These ranged from 50% for Canada to
over 99% for Israel. We estimate that performance in Korea and Sweden improved by less
than 10%.28
28Using H-P ﬁltered inﬂation and log-linear trend for output as targets the results are qualitatively identical
to our baseline estimates except that the performance gains for most of the countries are slightly smaller.
This is due to the reduction on the variability of inﬂation resulting from applying the H-P ﬁlter. Using
average inﬂation and log-linear trend for output as targets the results are nearly identical to our baseline
estimates. The only exceptions are that Austria and Finland now show a modest gain in performance, while
K o r e as h o w sam o d e r a t ep e r f o r m a n c el o s s .
22 






Value of Loss 
(10,000*P1) 
1991:I-1998:IV: 




Gain (in %) 
Australia    0.8 32.780  2.175  93.37% 
Austria    0.8 3.623  4.914 -35.63% 
Belgium    0.8 9.149  3.012  67.08% 
Canada    0.8 11.324  5.655  50.06% 
Chile    0.3  11.382 3.325  55.50% 
Denmark    0.8 553.370  246.248  70.79% 
Finland    0.8 14.642  16.304 -11.36% 
France    0.8 12.857  2.320  81.95% 
Germany    0.8 4.164  4.726 -13.50% 
Greece    0.3  93.360 36.196  61.23% 
Ireland    0.8 19.665  7.161  63.59% 
Israel    0.3  10768.85 43.60  99.60% 
Italy    0.8 40.340  6.892  82.92% 
Japan    0.8 11.264  8.804  21.85% 
Korea    0.8 26.296  24.149  8.89% 
Mexico    0.3  2288.62 160.035 93.01% 
Netherlands    0.8 2.728  1.267  53.55% 
New Zealand    0.8 73.419  10.588  85.58% 
Portugal    0.8 218.901  25.981  88.13% 
Spain    0.8 38.174  9.711  74.56% 
Sweden    0.8 25.118  23.106  8.01% 
Switzerland    0.8 7.228  4.733  34.52% 
U.K.    0.8 17.076  3.379  80.21% 
U.S.    0.8 29.868  5.207  82.57% 
 
Note: The estimates of the measures are median biased corrected, using the median of the 
empirical distribution generated by the bootstrap procedure. 
How important are these macroeconomic performance improvements? We evaluate this
by calculating how much of the performance improvement translates into lower average
inﬂation. That is, we ﬁnd the inﬂation that would have had to take place in the second
period (as a deviation from 2%), holding output variability equal to its ﬁrst period level, in
23order to explain the performance changes. Put slightly diﬀerently, using equation (1), we
control for the variability of output and attribute the changes in performance between the
two periods only to changes in the average inﬂation rate (i.e., how close is average inﬂation
to the target level of 2%).29 Looking at Israel, the 99.6% performance gain is equivalent
to a drop of 179 percentage points in the average annual inﬂation rate from one period to
the next. This is larger than the actual decrease in Israel’s annual inﬂation rate of nearly
120 percentage points between the 1980s and the 1990s. In the case of Australia, the 93.4%
improvement is equivalent to a drop of 4.8 percentage points in the inﬂation rate, somewhat
less than the over 5.9 percentage-point decline experienced there. Finally, for Mexico, the
93.0% improvement corresponds to a 65 percentage-point drop in inﬂation, slightly higher
than the fall from nearly 70% to 20% that actually occurred. Overall, we conclude that large
percentage changes in performance signal sizeable macroeconomic improvements.
5.2 More Eﬃcient Policy or a Calmer World?
Finally, we have arrived at the primary purpose for deriving all of these measurements:
dividing the performance change ∆P into the portion that is accounted for by improved
policy eﬃciency, ∆E, and the portion due to changes in the variability of supply shocks,
∆S. Given these other measures, we can compute the proportion of performance change
that is due to a change in the eﬃciency of policy, Q. We report each of these for all of the
countries in our sample. Importantly, in 21 of the 24 countries we study, policy eﬃciency
improved from the 1980s to the 1990s.
Table 2 reports the (bias-corrected) estimates of ∆P, ∆E, Q, together with the proba-
bility that the estimated measures have the incorrect sign.30 Out of the 21 countries that
experienced a macro performance gain, 14 countries (Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark,
29The computation of the inﬂation change that can account for the performance change come from setting
∆P equal to P1 − [λ(∆π − 0.02)2 +( 1− λ)Va r(y1)].
30These probabilities are constructed as follows: If the estimate for the measure is greater than zero, we
report the proportion of replications for which the measure is less than zero, divided by the number of
bootstrap replications (1,000), and conversely for the case when the estimate is less than zero.
24France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain the UK and the US)
experienced both an improvement in macro performance (∆P>0)a n dar e d u c t i o ni nt h e
variability of supply shocks (∆S<0). Under these circumstances, Q measures the contribu-
tion of a more eﬃcient monetary policy to the improvement of macroeconomic performance.
With the exception of Switzerland, all of the estimates suggest that policy has improved, and
this improvement is signiﬁcantly greater than zero at the 10% level for all of these countries.
 
Table 2: Estimates of the Measures 
 
Country 
Change in policy 
efficiency 
(10,000*∆E) 




policy to change 
in performance 
(Q=∆E/∆P) 
Australia    28.98     (0.00)  30.60    (0.00)  0.947   (0.00) 
Austria    -0.96     (0.28)  -1.29     (0.21)  -0.744  (0.28) 
Belgium    5.41      (0.10)  6.14      (0.06) 0.882      (0.10) 
Canada    9.14      (0.00)  5.67     (0.00)  1.612   (0.00) 
Chile    277.55  (0.00)  307.12  (0.00)  0.904  (0.00) 
Denmark    7.49      (0.00)  8.06      (0.00)  0.930   (0.00) 
Finland    2.46      (0.25)  -1.66    (0.32)  1.481   (0.25) 
France    9.99      (0.00)  10.54    (0.00)  0.948   (0.00) 
Germany    -0.59     (0.26)  -0.56    (0.26)  -1.045  (0.26) 
Greece    53.31     (0.00)  57.16    (0.00)  0.933   (0.00) 
Ireland    12.91      (0.00)  12.50     (0.29)  1.033   (0.00) 
Israel    10340    (0.00) 10725   (0.00)  0.964   (0.00) 
Italy    33.15     (0.00)  33.45    (0.00) 0.991      (0.00) 
Japan    2.76       (0.24)  2.46      (0.27)  1.123   (0.24) 
Korea    2.88       (0.44)  2.15      (0.46)  1.344   (0.44) 
Mexico    2005.6   (0.00)  2128.6  (0.00) 0.942      (0.00) 
Netherlands    1.97       (0.00)  1.46      (0.00) 1.352   (0.00) 
New Zealand    56.57     (0.04)  62.83     (0.02) 0.900   (0.04) 
Portugal    168.02   (0.00) 192.92   (0.00) 0.871   (0.00) 
Spain    25.91     (0.00)  28.46     (0.00) 0.910   (0.00) 
Sweden    9.57      (0.24)  2.01      (0.47) 4.755   (0.24) 
Switzerland    -0.32     (0.44)  2.49      (0.14) -0.128  (0.44) 
U.K.    11.43     (0.02)  13.70     (0.01) 0.835   (0.02) 
U.S.    22.41     (0.08)  24.66     (0.06) 0.909   (0.08) 
 
Note: The estimates of the measures are median biased corrected, using the median of the 
empirical distribution generated by the bootstrap procedure. The probability that the estimate is of 
the opposite sign is in parenthesis. 
 
25Looking at the ﬁnal column, the results show that more eﬃcient policy accounted for
between 84% (U.K.) and 99% (Italy) of the improvement in overall macroeconomic per-
formance. Six other countries (Canada, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Netherlands and Sweden)
experienced both a performance gain (∆P>0) and an increase in the variability of supply
shocks (∆S>0). For these countries, the policy eﬃciency gain has more than oﬀset the
higher variability of aggregate shocks and, hence, monetary policy improvements account
completely for the observed macro performance gain. More eﬃcient policy is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level for Canada, Ireland and the Netherlands, but not for Japan, Korea and Swe-
den. Finally, we also observe that, in all countries that experienced a macro performance
improvement (once again, excluding Switzerland), better monetary policy accounts for over
80 percent of the observed performance gain, suggesting that monetary policy has played
a far more important role than the reduced variability of shocks in macroeconomic stabi-
lization. This can be clearly seen in Figure 4, which depicts the percentage gain in macro
p e r f o r m a n c ea n dt h ea m o u n to ft h i sg a i nt h a ti sd u et om o r ee ﬃcient policy. We note that
in the majority of the countries we study, the contribution to macro performance by the
decrease in the variability of aggregate shocks has been insigniﬁcant.
We now turn to the results for the countries that exhibited a macroeconomic performance
loss from the 1980s to the 1990s (∆P<0), which are only Austria, Finland and Germany.
In all cases, our results suggest that the countries were exposed to a higher variability of
supply shocks (∆S>0). In particular, for the case of Finland more eﬃcient policy was
able to partially oﬀset the increased variability of the shocks (∆E>0), which implies
that the macroeconomic performance loss would have been much larger if not for policy
improvement. Nevertheless, neither the performance change, nor the policy eﬃciency change
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for these three countries, and the performance losses in
all cases were quite modest; in no case did it exceed a loss equivalent to an increase of 0.5%
26in the average inﬂation rate.31

































































































































































































Performance gain due to policy Total performance gain
Once again, we can look at examples to see how much improved policy translates into
lower average inﬂation, controlling for the variances around the mean of both inﬂation and
output. For Israel, the eﬃciency gain amounts to a decrease of 173 percentage points in the
average annual inﬂation rate from one period to the next; for Australia, policy improvement
corresponds to a drop of 4.5 percentage points in the inﬂation rate, while for Mexico it
corresponds to a 61.3 percentage-point drop in average inﬂation.
31Using average inﬂation and log-linear trend for output as targets the contribution of policy is nearly
identical to our baseline estimates. The only exceptions are Korea, Austria and Finland, since the ﬁrst one
shows a performance loss while the other two show a modest gain. Using H-P ﬁltered inﬂation and log-linear
trend for output as targets the contribution of policy for about half of the countries is smaller, but still more
important than the contribution of the reduction of the shocks. Our main conclusions are thus robust to
diﬀerent inﬂation and output targets.
27 
Table 3: Performance and Efficiency Changes  




Performance Gain (in %) 
Contribution of policy to change in 
performance (Q=∆E/∆P) 
Australia    [93.3%, 93.5%]  [0.945, 0.949] 
Austria    [-70.5%, 17.7%]  [-0.747, 1.040] 
Belgium    [49.5%, 86.4%]  [0.812, 0.992] 
Canada    [43.9%, 60.6%]  [1.424, 1.763] 
Chile    [52.4%, 58.8%]  [0.895, 0.912] 
Denmark    [54.9%, 90.7%]  [0.894, 0.977] 
Finland    [-119%, 69.0%]  [-0.488, 36.807] 
France    [69.3%, 92.7%]  [0.907, 1.014] 
Germany    [-46.8%, -3.9%]  [-2.231, -0.704] 
Greece    [61.1%, 61.5%]  [0.892, 0.949] 
Ireland    [41.2%, 88.0%]  [0.994, 2.673] 
Israel    [99.4%, 99.7%]  [0.963, 0.965] 
Italy    [80.7%, 84.7%]  [0.983, 0.997] 
Japan    [2.7%, 25.7%]  [1.087, 2.765] 
Korea    [-6.0%, 41.6%]  [-0.342, 3.314] 
Mexico    [91.9%, 93.4%]  [0.941, 0.943] 
Netherlands    [42.7%, 68.0%]  [1.217, 1.513] 
New Zealand    [73.4%, 95.6%]  [0.883, 0.911] 
Portugal    [84.5%, 90.7%]  [0.868, 0.873] 
Spain    [64.6%, 82.1%]  [0.893, 0.920] 
Sweden    [-53.8%, 54.6%]  [0.297, 45.013] 
Switzerland    [3.8%, 47.6%]  [-9.652, 0.196] 
U.K.    [80.1%, 80.3%]  [0.834, 0.835] 
U.S.    [70.9%, 91.1%]  [0.880, 0.959] 
 
Finally, as a robustness check to our choice of inﬂation aversion parameter, we examine
how the estimates of changes in performance and policy eﬃciency change as we vary λ.F o r
the countries for which we set λ equal to 0.8, we consider a range of 0.65 to 0.95. This is
consistent with estimates obtained by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2001) and Krause (2003).
28For the four high inﬂation countries, where the baseline value of λ was set to 0.3, we consider
a range between 0.15 and 0.45. Results are reported in Table 3.
Contemplating these ranges for the central bank’s preferences, we see that our conclusions
are largely unaﬀected. The only exceptions are Austria, Finland, Korea and Switzerland. In
these four cases, changing λ can cause a change in the sign for both ∆P and Q.32
5.3 Robustness Exercises33
In our ﬁrst exercise we restrict our 24-country sample to those countries that do not show
a price-puzzle in the IRFs. The purpose is to analyze whether our results hinge on the
arguably failure of the estimated transmission mechanism of a few countries.34 Our main
results about the contribution of monetary policy to the observed macroeconomic improve-
ment hold for this restricted sample of 16 countries. Out of these countries, 13 of them
experienced a macroeconomic performance gain and within them 10 experienced a reduction
in the variability of shocks (∆S<0). For these countries, improved policy accounted for
between 87% (Portugal) and 95% (Australia and France). For the 3 remaining countries
(Canada, Ireland, and Netherlands), policy eﬃciency gain still more than oﬀsets the higher
variability of aggregate shocks. In summary, our conclusions are unchanged if we restrict
our sample to those countries for which the IRFs do not show a price-puzzle.35
In the second exercise we reconcile our results with those of Stock and Watson (2003),
which, using a diﬀerent method, attribute the stabilization of output in the US after 1984
to "good luck" (reduction in the variability of shocks) rather than good policies (only about
10% contribution). The answer to reconciling their apparently opposite results with ours
lies in the diﬀerent subperiods considered by Stock and Watson (pre- and post-1984) and
32We note again that our results are robust to using estimates of λ obtained within our methodology,
which are available upon request.
33We thank the referees and the editor for suggesting these analyses.
34The countries that still present price-puzzles are 8: I s r a e l ,I t a l y ,J a p a n ,K o r e a ,S w e d e n ,S w i t z e r l a n d ,
UK, and the US.
35Interestingly, out of the 8 countries that showed ill-behaved IRFs, for 4 of them our measure of the
contribution of policy to the change in macro performance (Q) was not signiﬁcant in Table 2.
29their diﬀerent focus: they focus exclusively on output volatility. Applying our method to the
same subperiods considered by Stock and Watson, and setting λ= 0 (i.e. focus exclusively
on output volatility) we are able to obtain very similar results to theirs: policy only explains
about 18% of the reduction in output volatility for the US, and the macro performance gain
is only 5%. If, as in our analysis, λ is set at 0.8, macro performance gain increases to 11%
and policy explains 45% of it. Clearly, in our analysis, inﬂation volatility accounts for much
of macro performance, and it is monetary policy that is responsible for that.
6 Accounting for changes in performance and policy
eﬃciency
What is responsible for the very pronounced improvements in policy that we have been able
to document? Over the past 20 years, much has changed in the 24 countries that we study.
Both private and oﬃcial sector institutions have changed, and dramatically so in some cases.
A prime candidate among possible explanations is the institutional framework of central
banks. It is natural to ask if the move to more independent and transparent central banks
c o u l db er e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h ei m p r o v e m e n t st h a tw eh a v ef o u n d .
Addressing this question head on is hampered by data availability. We have no consistent
data on changes in independence, transparency and accountability of central banks — those
things that theory tell us should matter for the ability of monetary policymakers to do their
jobs. Cecchetti and Krause (2002) do look at the relationship between a set of 1998 survey
measures of these framework variables and macroeconomic performance and policy eﬃciency
during the 1990s. They ﬁnd that, with the exception of a combination of transparency
and credibility, these end-of-period measures cannot explain the changes over the prior two
decades.36
It is interesting to go further in assessing the role of central bank independence in ex-
36Cecchetti and Krause (2002) measure policy credibility by looking at past inﬂation performance.
30plaining the cross-diﬀerences in the changes in macroeconomic and policy outcomes. To do
this, we construct three measures of the change in independence based on measures from the
1980s. Speciﬁcally, we standardize Fry et al.’s (2000) index for independence, which takes
a base year 1998, and compare it to the standardized indices from the studies by Alesina
(1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) (all of
these are only available for a subset of the countries we study); for this last study we use
the 1990 data for the independence index. In this way, we obtain three diﬀerent measures
of changes in central bank autonomy and relate them to our measures of performance and
policy eﬃciency.
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Table 4 presents simple correlations between the three indices of independence changes
and our measures of macroeconomic performance and policy eﬃciency changes. We observe
that there is a positive correlation between changes in central bank autonomy and the perfor-
mance and eﬃciency loss measures. Unfortunately, none of these correlations is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at even the 10% level.37
37Another factor that may explain changes in performance and eﬃciency, as we mentioned in Section 2,
is a shift towards inﬂation targeting. Looking at the 24 countries, we ﬁnd evidence pointing to a positive
correlation between adopting inﬂation targeting and better macroeconomic and policy outcomes. This result,
however, is mostly due to improvements experienced by three countries (Israel, Mexico and Chile), which
31This result, in conjunction with the ﬁndings in Cecchetti and Krause (2002), suggests
that factors other than the monetary policy framework may account for the cross-country
diﬀerences in macroeconomic outcomes and policy eﬃciency. Cecchetti and Krause (2001)
explore the possibility that changes in the ﬁnancial structure may be responsible. They note
that a reduction in direct state ownership of bank assets and the introduction of explicit
deposit insurance can help explain improvements in measures like ∆P and ∆E.T h i s i s
consistent with the lending view of the monetary transmission process, which posits that
ﬁnancial institutions -and their importance as a source of funds for private agents- play a
key role in determining the impact policy will have on its goal variables.
Still, in order to determine why countries vary so much in their improvements in perfor-
mance and policy, we would need to go into more detail by analyzing the events that took
place in each country individually during the period under consideration. Such an endeavor
is beyond the scope of this study.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper proposes a general method for analyzing changes in macroeconomic performance
and identifying the relative contributions of improvements in the eﬃciency of monetary
policy and changes in the variability of aggregate supply shocks. We apply our technique
to a cross-section of 24 industrialized and developing countries in order to compare their
macroeconomic performance in the 1980s with that in the 1990s. We are able to determine
that in 21 of the 24 countries that we study, monetary policy became more eﬃcient in the
1990s.
In 20 of the 21 countries that experienced more stable macroeconomic outcomes, better
policy accounted for over 80% of the measured gain. While policy eﬃciency improved in
Finland, it was unable to completely oﬀset the increased variability of shocks hitting the
adopted inﬂation targeting in the 1990s, as a reaction of the high inﬂation they had during the 1980s.
Controlling for these three cases, the correlation becomes no longer signiﬁcant.
32economy. Only in Austria and Germany did both policy deteriorate and the variability of
supply shocks increase.
Finally, we consider some factors that may help in explaining the cross-country diﬀerences
in macroeconomic and policy outcomes. Our ﬁndings, both in the present paper and in
previous research, suggest that elements such as central bank credibility and transparency,
together with the nature of the ﬁnancial system, can account for at least some portion of
the observed improvements.
In summary, our results suggest that more eﬃcient policy has been the driving force
behind improved macroeconomic performance. At the same time it has also contributed,
at least in part, to oﬀsetting an increased variability of supply shocks in some countries.
Overall, lower variability of the aggregate supply shocks has usually played a minor role.
338 Appendix I: Model Speciﬁcation
The basic model consists of two equations. The aggregate demand equation (6) relates
(demeaned and detrended) log industrial production to two of its own lags, two lags of the
nominal interest rate, one lag of demeaned inﬂation and one lag of demeaned external price
inﬂation. The aggregate supply equation (7) relates inﬂation to three of its own lags, one lag
of (demeaned and detrended) log industrial production and one lag of demeaned external
price inﬂation. External price inﬂation is measured by the annualized growth rate in the
oﬃcial exchange rate of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the currency of its main trading
partner: Germany for the European countries, Japan for the Asian countries, and the U.S.
for the rest. For some countries we also included additional lags, and dummy variables to
account for currency crises, sharp recessions, or structural changes. Table A.1 provides a
description of all the variables included in the aggregate demand - aggregate supply model
for each country.
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Table A.1: Model Specification 
 
Country Explanatory  variables  in 
AD-equation (# of lags) 
Explanatory variables in 
AS-equation (# of lags) 
Australia  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1)  
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Austria  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Belgium  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (2), Dummy 
variable (sharp output decline 86:I) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 93:I-IV) 
Canada  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1)  
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Chile  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(increase in money growth 92:I) 
Denmark  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1), Dummy 
variable (sharp output decline 86:II-87:I) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Finland  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 92:III-93:IV) 
France  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Germany  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Greece  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1), Dummy 
variable (sharp output decline 84:I-IV and 
93:I-94:IV) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Ireland  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 93:I-IV and 95:I-IV) 
Israel  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Italy  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 92:III-93:IV) 
Japan  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Korea  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
Mexico  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 83:I-IV and 95:I-II) 
Netherlands  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
New Zealand  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable (tax 
increases 85:I, 86:IV and 89:III) 
Portugal  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchan. rate crisis 92:IV-93:IV and 95:I-II) 
Spain  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchan. rate crisis 92:IV-93:IV and 95:I-II) 
Sweden  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), Dummy variable 
(exchange rate crisis 92:III-93:IV) 
Switzerland  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
UK  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1), 
USA  Interest rate (2), Industrial production (2), 
Inflation (2), External Inflation (1) 
Industrial production (2), Inflation (2), 
External Inflation (1) 
359 Appendix II: Data Sources
Inﬂation and Output data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are
from Datastream; those for Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland
and the United States are taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. Data for Chile
are from the Central Bank of Chile’s WWW-homepage (inﬂation), and from DRI (industrial
production); Israeli data are taken from DRI (industrial production, and inﬂation). Korea’s
data are taken from IFS (industrial production) and DRI (inﬂation).
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